The public image of statistics does change, and recently the changes have been mostly for the better, as we've all seen. But occasional court cases, a few conspicuous failures, and even appeals to mysticism suggest that careful thought may be in order. And even the discipline itself has two theories, and these can give contradictory answers with the discipline largely indifferent. Saying "we are just exploring!" or appealing to mysticism can't really be appropriate, no matter the spin. We examine three current approaches to central theory and find that if continuity that is present in the model is also required for the methods then the conflicts and contradictions disappear.
Introduction
L'Aquila and 300 deaths. The earthquake at L'Aquila in Italy on April 5, 2009 had been preceded by many small shocks, and Italy's Civil Protection Department established a committee of seismologists to address the risks of a major earthquake; the committee reported on March 31 2009 that there was no particularly good reason to think that a major earthquake was coming and the Department's deputy head then allowed that the small shocks were reducing the seismic stresses, lowering the chances of a major quake. This gave some reassurance to many who were concerned for their lives; but the earth quake did come and more than 300 died. For some details see Pielke [27] . Charges were then brought against the seismologists and seven were sentenced to six years in prison for manslaughter,"for falsely reassuring the inhabitants of L'Aquila". Part of the committee's role had been the communication of their findings, statistics being involved. See Marshall [25] and Prats [28] . ial things, I soon drifted to the statistics group led by Sam Wilks and John Tukey. A prominent theme was Neyman-Pearson but a persistent seminar interest focussed on Fisher's writings particularly those on fiducial which had in turn triggered the Neyman [26] confidence methodology. But also, a book by Jeffreys [23] kept reemerging in discussions; it offered what might now be called a default Bayes [2] approach, or even an objective Bayes approach. The striking thing for me at that time was the presence of two theories for statistics that gave contradictory results: if the results were contradictory, then simple logic on theories says that one or other or both are wrong. This latter view, however, was not part of the professional milieu at that time, though there was lurking puzzlement and vague acceptance of contradictions, as being in the nature of things; and this may even be part of current thinking! One or other might be wrong? Physics managea to elicit billions in taxpayer money to assess their theories! Should statistics?
With a completed thesis that avoided the frequency-Bayes contradictions I accepted a position in Mathematics at Toronto and became a landed immigrant (sic) to Canada. The interest in the frequency-Bayes contradictions, however, remained and a conference talk in 1959 and two resulting papers [21] , [22] explored a broad class of statistical models for which the two approaches gave equivalent results: the location model f (y − θ) of course and the locally generated group extension, the transformation parameter model. Then in 1963 a senior faculty position in Mathematics at Princeton was offered, but for conflicting reasons not connected with Princeton, Mathematics or Statistics was declined. The concerns for the frequency-Bayes contradictions, however, remained! Now in 2013 with this COPPS collection in development we can look about and say "What's new?" And even more we are encouraged to reminisce! There is very active frequency statistics and data analysis; and there is very active Bayesian statistics; and they still give contradictory answers. So nothing has changed on the frequency-Bayes disconnect: what goes around comes around, .... in statistical theory in the 65 years! Oh, of course, there have been massive extensions to data exploration, to computer implementation, and to simulations. Certainly we have Precision, when sought! But what about Accuracy? Accuracy beyond Precision? And what about the frequency-Bayes contradictions in the theory? And even, indeed, the fact that no one seems to care? And then L'Aquila, Vioxx, Challenger, and of course the contradictory theory? Are perceptions being suppressed? It might wind up in a court, as with L'Aquila. Or in mysticism as sometimes with Bayes.
Well yes, something has changed! Now a general feeling in the milieu is acceptance of the frequency-Bayes contradiction: it just doesn't matter, we are just exploring; our models are just approximations; our calculations are just approximations; and we can acquire what ever Precision we want, just run the McMC longer, even though several million cycles only give 2 decimal places for some wanted probability or confidence calculation. Or just put together an algorithm for processing numbers. Or appeal to vague mysticism in the religious origins of Bayes methods.
But even for explorations it behooves one to have calibrated tools! And more generally to know with Precision and Accuracy what a model with data implies? Know as a separate issue quite apart from the descriptive Accuracy of the model in a particular context, which of course in itself is an important but separate issue! This Accuracy is rarely addressed! Indeed, as L'Aquila, Vioxx, and Challenger indicate, a concern for Accuracy in the end products of statistics and statistical science may have an elusive presence in many professional endeavours.
Is this an indictment of statistics?
1.3 Where do the probabilities come from?
(i) The model-data starting point. The statistical model f (y; θ) with data y 0 forms the starting point for the Bayes and often for the frequency approach. The Bayes calculates and typically uses just the observed likelihood L 0 (θ) = f (y 0 ; θ), omitting other model information as part of the Bayes commitment. The frequency approach uses more than just the observed likelihood function L 0 (θ) = f (y 0 ; θ): it can use distribution functions and full model calculations, and can sometimes use component model calculations when these provide relevant precision information, often from model characteristics near the observed data point y 0 . (ii) The ingredients for inference. In the model-data context the y 0 is an observed value and is thus a known constant, and the θ is an unknown constant. And if a distribution π(θ) is present, assumed, proposed or created, as the source for θ, then a second distribution is on offer concerning the unknown constant. Probabilities are then sought for the unknown constant, in the context of one or two distributional sources: one part of the given and the other objective, subjective, or appended for computational or other reasons. Should these distributions be combined, or be examined separately, or should the added distribution be ignored? No over-riding principle says that distributions of different status or quality should be combined rather than have their consequences judged separately! The present Bayes methodology, however, takes the combining as a given, just as the use of only the observed likelihood function is taken as a given! These givens operate essentially as axioms in the Bayes methodology! For some recent discussion see [15] .
(iii) The simple location model. Consider the location model f (y−θ). This is of course rather special in that the error, the variable minus the parameter, has a fixed known distributional shape, free of the parameter. A common added or proposed prior is the flat prior π(θ) representing the translation invariance of the model. As it stands the model almost seems too simple for consideration here; but the reality is that this simple model exists as an embedded approximation in an incredibly broad class of models where continuity of parameter effect is present, and thus should have its effects included.
(iv) p-value or s-value: location model. The generic version of the p-value from observed data y 0 is
it records just the statistical position of the data relative to the parameter. As such it is just the observed distribution function. This p(θ) function is Uniform (0, 1), which in turn implies that any related confidence bound or confidence interval has validity, validity (Neyman, 1937 [26] , Fisher, 1930 [11] ) in the sense that it bounds or embraces the true parameter value with the stated reliability. In parallel, the observed Bayes survivor value is
The two different directions of integration correspond to data left of the parameter and parameter right of the data, at least in this case where the variable is stochastically increasing in the parameter. The two integrals are mathematically equal as is seen from a routine calculus change of variable in the integration. Thus the Bayes survivor s-value acquires validity here, validity in the sense that it has the Uniform(0,1) distribution; and validity also in the sense that a Bayes quantile at a level β will have the confidence property and bound the parameter at the stated level. This validity depends entirely on the equivalence of the integrals and no reference or appeal to conditional probability is involved or invoked. Thus in this location model context a sample space integration can routinely be replaced by a parameter space integration, a pure calculus formality. And thus in the location model context there is no frequency-Bayes contradiction, just the matter of choosing the prior that yields the translation property which in turn enables the integration change of variable and thus the transfer of integration to the parameter space. A known but not widely advertised property! (v) The simple scalar model. Now consider a stochastically increasing scalar model f (y; θ) with distribution function F (y; θ) and some minimum continuity and regularity. The observed p-value is
where the subscripts to F denote partial differentiation with respect to the indicated arguments. Each of the integrals records an F (y, θ) value as an integral of its derivative, the fundamental theorem of calculus, one with respect to θ and the other with respect to y. This is pure computation, entirely without Bayes connotation! And then, quite separately, the Bayes survivor value using a proffered prior π(θ) is 
The second equality comes from the total derivative of u = F (y; θ) set equal to zero, thus determining how θ-change affects y for fixed probability position. We can also view v(θ) = ∂y(θ; u)/∂θ for fixed u as being the change in y caused by change in θ, thus giving at y 0 a differential version of the y, θ analysis in the preceding subsection.
Again, with this simple scalar model analysis, there is no frequency-Bayes contradiction; it is just a matter of getting the prior right. The correct prior does depend on the data point y 0 ; but this should cause no concern. If the objective of Bayesian analysis is to extract all accessible information from an observed likelihood and if this then requires the tailoring of the prior to the particular data then this is in accord with that objective; data dependent priors have been around for a long time; see for example Box and Cox (1964) [5] . But of course this data dependence does conflict with an optimistic Bayesian view that a single prior should be available for each model type; or that any analysis must conform to the prescribed Bayes formula. The realities of data analysis may not be as simple as the Bayes approach might wish.
(vii) What's the conclusion. With a location model, Bayes and frequency approaches are in full agreement: Bayes gets it right because the Bayes calculation is just a frequency confidence calculation in mild disguise. However, with a non-location model, the Bayes claim with a %-age attached to an interval does require a data-dependent prior. But to make reference then to the conditional probability lemma renamed as Bayes lemma necessarily requires that a missing ingredient for that lemma be made up or created to support the use of the term probability: this violates mathematics and science.
Inference for regular models: frequency
(i) Normal, exponential and regular models. Much of contemporary inference theory is organized around Normal statistical models with side concerns for departures from Normality, thus neglecting more general structures. Recent likelihood methods show, however, that statistical inference is easy and direct for exponential models and more generally for regular models using an exponential as an asymptotic approximation. Accordingly we give a brief overview of inference for exponential models.
(ii) Exponential statistical model. The exponential family of models is widely useful both for model building and for model-data analysis. The full exponential model with canonical parameter ϕ and canonical variable u(y) both of dimension p is f (y; ϕ) = exp{ϕ u(y) + k(ϕ)}h(y); let y 0 with u 0 = u(y 0 ) be observed data for which statistical inference is wanted. For many purposes we can work with the model in terms of the sufficient statistic u:
where 0 (ϕ) = a + log f (y 0 ; ϕ) is the observed log-likelihood function with the usual arbitrary constant. If we then choose the constant a to subtract the maximum likelihood log f (y 0 ;φ 0 ), whereφ 0 is the observed maximum likelihood value, then the revised 0 (ϕ) has value 0 atφ 0 , and − 0 (ϕ) is the cumulant generating function of u − u 0 , and g(u) is a probability density function. The saddlepoint then gives a third-order inversion of the cumulant generating function − 0 (ϕ) enabling the third-order rewrite
whereφ =φ(u) is the maximum likelihood value for the tilted likelihood
is the related loglikelihood ratio quantity, and  ϕϕ (u) = (∂/∂ϕ∂ϕ ) (ϕ; u)|φ (u) is the observed information matrix, and finally k/n is constant to third order. The density approximation g(u; ϕ 0 ) gives an essentially unique third-order null distribution [17] for testing the parameter value ϕ = ϕ 0 .
Then if the parameter ϕ is scalar, we can use standard r * -technology to calculate the p-value p(ϕ 0 ) for assessing ϕ = ϕ 0 ; see for example Brazzale et al (2007) [6] . And if the parameter ϕ is vector valued, then the directed r * departure is available; see for example Davison et al (2013) [8] . Thus p-values are widely available with high third-order accuracy, all with uniqueness coming from the continuity of the parameter's effect on the variable involved; see in part [14] .
(iii) Testing component parameters. Now consider more generally a component parameter ψ(ϕ) of dimension d with d < p. If ψ is linear in ϕ then a rotation of coordinates lets us write ϕ = (χ, λ) with χ equivalent to ψ and with say (s, t) as the corresponding canonical coordinates. Statistical inference is available from the d-dimensional conditional distribution on the profile line or plane L 0 = {(s, t 0 )} with parameter χ. This uses in an essential way the profile likelihood ratio r 2 (χ; s)/2 = P (χ; s) − P (χ; s) = (s, t 0 ;χ,λ) − (s, t 0 ; χ,λ χ ) but needs a norming constant involving a nuisance information determinant.
But more generally when the interest parameter ψ is non-linear and thus curved in the initial ϕ parameterization the conditional approach just described is effectively unavailable and a marginal approach coming from recent likelihood asymptotics is needed. This involves integrating out over a nuisance parameter variable, and gives to third order the marginal distribution for an ancillary variable under ψ = ψ 0 :
Hereˆ −˜ is the log-likelihood ratio at (s, t 0 ) for the tested value ψ 0 , and the nuisance information uses λ with given ψ = ψ 0 and with λ derivatives rescaled in terms of the given ϕ parameterization as indicated by the parentheses and described in [18] , [6] or [8] . This distribution is essentially unique if continuity of parameter effect is respected; and it is simple, involving only the log-likelihood ratio and information determinants. In the linear parameter case where the conditional approach is available, this agrees with that conditional result; but here there is no easily accessible conditional approach and the present marginal approach is the reference standard. Our purpose here is to report just on the availability of these unique null distributions and related p-values, for both linear and curved parameters; for details see Fraser [17] .
(iv) Regular statistical model. Now consider a statistical model f (y; θ) with continuity in parameter effect and general regularity; for such models we can find, quite widely, a quantile representation y = y(θ, u) as discussed briefly for a simple case after (1.3). Such representations are widely used for simulations and are routine and definitive in cases where the model has independent scalar coordinates; in such cases u is the vector of coordinate p-values. Let V (θ, y) = ∂y(θ; u)/∂θ be the n × p matrix giving the vectors that record the effect on y of change in the parameter coordinates θ 1 , . . . , θ p ; and let V = V (θ 0 , y 0 ) = V 0 be the observed matrix. Then V records tangents to an intrinsic ancillary contour say a(y) = a(y 0 ) that passes through the observed y 0 ; thus V represents directions in which the data can be viewed as measuring the parameter, and LV gives the tangent space to the ancillary at the observed data, with V having somewhat the role of a design matrix. For development details see [20] .
From ancillarity it follows that conditional likelihood is equal to the overall likelihood L 0 (θ), to an order one higher than that of the ancillary used. And it also follows that the sample space gradient of the log-likelihood in the directions V along the ancillary contour,
gives the canonical parameter whenever the conditional model is exponential, or gives the canonical parameter of an approximating exponential model otherwise. In either case, 0 (θ) with ϕ(θ) from (1.7) provides third order statistical inference using the saddlepoint expression (1.5) and the above technology. And this statistical inference is uniquely determined provided continuity in the model is respected, [20] . For further discussion and details see Fraser and Reid (1995) [19] and Fraser et al (2010) [13] .
Inference for regular models: Bootstrap
Consider a regular statistical model as discussed in the preceding section and suppose we are interested in testing a d-dimensional parameter ψ(ϕ) = ψ 0 with observed data y 0 . The bootstrap distribution is f (y; ψ 0 ,λ 0 ψ0 ) as used in DiCiccio and Young (2008) [10] and from a log-model perspective in Fraser and Rousseau (2008) [20] .
The ancillary density (1.6) recorded in the preceding section is third order free of the nuisance parameter λ. Thus the bootstrap f (y; ψ 0 ,λ 0 ψ0 ) provides sampling for this ancillary and is third-order equivalent to that from the true sampling f (y; ψ 0 , λ): just a different λ when the ancillary distribution is free of λ. From a different viewpoint the ancillary directions (1.7) calculated for λ with fixed ψ 0 are tangent directions to such an ancillary. We thus have two procedures for determining the ancillary contour through observed data; and the bootstrap simulation gives p-values by simulation and the usual higher order calculations gives p-values by asymptotics from (1.6).
Now consider the profile contour L 0 through the data point y 0 . In the calculations for the ancillary denseiy (1.6) we used the ancillary contours known to exist and passing through points on L 0 . Now we have :available various signed likelihood ratios for coordinates of ψ 0 : these give the exponential model density on L 0 and thus the second factor in (1.6); and the third factor, the information determinant, is directly available from the likelihood at points on L 0 ; but the fourth comes from integration along the contours of the vector statistic being used which now is vector signed likelihood ratio for coordinates of ψ 0 and these are used for Laplace integration of the nuisance variable. Now consider a scalar statistic t(y) targeted say on a particular coordinate of ψ = ψ 0 ; the corresponding p-value calculated at the data y 0 using the true f (y; ψ 0 , λ) will typically depend on λ. Also if we calculate the p-value at some point y using the bootstrap f (y; ψ 0 ,λ 0 ψ0 ) distribution it is of course functionally free of λ. If then we examine the contour of points y through the observed y 0 that have the same similarly-calculated p-value, we obtain a contour of true pvalues with dependence on λ one order less. This is familiar with the bootstrap procedure and is available from a log-model approach in [20] .
For the bootstrap to work to third order in one cycle the seed statistic needs to be strategically chosen, say the signed likelihood root as indicated in [10] . We have of course that a contour of the signed likelihood roots has first order ancillarity for testing the fixed ψ 0 , and the curvature at L 0 is in first order agreement with the curvature of ψ 0 at the constrained maximumφ 0 ψ0 . As such we have the ingredients for the ancillary calculation for (1.6) and the bootstrap f (y; ψ 0 ,λ 0 ψ0 ) calculation gives second order ancillary contours and thus third order p-values.
This means that the bootstrap and the higher order calculations are third order equivalent in generality. The bootstrap calculations can thus be viewed as conditional given ancillary information; in other words the bootstrap can be viewed as having the same conditional properties as the higher order calculations, although this is not part of the bootstrap development. This equivalence was presented for the linear interest parameter case in the exponential model case in [10] . We now have that it holds widely for regular models with linear or curved scalar interest parameters.
Inference for regular models: Bayes
(i) Jeffreys prior. The discussion with formula (1.3) shows that Bayes validity in general requires data-dependent priors. For the scalar exponential model, however, Welch and Peers [29] showed that the Jeffreys [23] root information prior π(θ) = j 1/2 θθ provides full second order validity, and is presented as a globally defined prior and indeed is not data-dependent. The Welch-Peers presentation did use expected information, but with exponential models the observed information can have notational advantages but does need to be calculated in the canonical parameterization and does give equivalent results. Then, are such results available for the vector exponential model?
For the vector regression-scale model, Jeffreys subsequently noted that his root information prior [23] was unsatisfactory and proposed an effective alternative for that model. And for more general contexts Bernardo [4] proposed reference posteriors and thus reference priors, based on maximizing the Kullback-Leibler distance between prior and posterior. These priors have wide acceptance.
(ii) The Bayes objective: likelihood based inference. Another way of viewing Bayesian analysis is as a procedure to extract the maximum possible information from an observed likelihood function L 0 (θ). This suggests asymptotic analysis and Taylor expansion about the observed maximum likelihood valueθ 0 . For this we assume a p-dimensional exponential model g(u; ϕ) as expressed in terms of its canonical parameter ϕ and its canonical variable u, either as the given model or as the higher-order approximation mentioned in §1.4. There are also advantages in using versions of the parameter and of the variable so that the observed information matrix ρρ dρ for ρ gives second order inference for the conditional distribution. But likelihood theory shows that the conditional distribution to second order is also the marginal distribution for assessing ρ so the prior gives second order inference generally for ρ; see Fraser (2103) [17] .
(iv) The differential prior. Now suppose the prior 
1/2
ρρ dρ is used on each linê ϕ 0 + Le; this composite prior is called the differential prior [16] ) and uses coordinates with 0 ϕϕ = I as mentioned in (ii) above. This extracts second-order inference from the observed likelihood L 0 (θ); it is of course subject to the well known limitation on distributions for parameters, both confidence distributions and Bayes distributions: that they give incorrect results for curved parameters unless the pivot or prior is targeted on the curved parameter of interest. For further details see David, Stone and Zidek [9] , and Fraser(2011) [15] .
(v) Just a location model!: Then why not use the location property? The radial prior  1/2 ρρ dρ for ρ leads to a constant-information parameterization relative to the corresponding maximum likelihood variable; these have a location relationship near the observed (y 0 ,φ 0 ). As a consequence the p-value integral out from y 0 has a reflected Bayes survivor s-value out fromφ 0 and thus we have an equivalence to the second order used here. This is not a full location model property, just a location property near the data point; but this local property is all that is needed for the reflected transfer of probability from the sample space to the parameter space.
The frequency-Bayes contradiction
So is there a frequency-Bayes contradiction? Or a frequency-bootstrap-Bayes contradiction? Not if one respects the continuity widely present in regular statistical models and then requires that that continuity be respected in the frequency calculation and in the Bayes calculation.
Frequency theory of course routinely leaves open the choice of pivotal quantity which provides the basis for tests, confidence bounds, and the related intervals and distributions. And Bayes theory leaves open the choice of the prior for extracting information from the likelihood function. And the bootstrap needs a tactical choice of initial statistic to succeed in one bootstrap cycle. Thus on the surface there is a lot of apparent arbitrariness in the usual inference procedures, with a consequent potential for serious contradictions. In the frequency approach however this arbitrariness essentially disappears if continuity of parameter effect in the model is respected, and then required in the corresponding inference calculations; see Fraser et al [14] and the present §1.4.. And for the Bayes approach, §1.6, the arbitrariness can disappear if the need for data dependence is acknowledged and the locally based differential prior is used to examine sample space probability on the parameter space; this extracts full second order information from the likelihood function: Fraser [16] .
The frequency and the bootstrap approaches can succeed without arbitrariness to third order; the Bayes approach can succeed to second order provided the parameter is linear, but does not handle curved parameters;, which typically need a prior targeted on the specific curved parameter of interest. Thus when distributions are used to describe unknown parameter values, both Bayes and frequency, they need to avoid or accommodate curved parameters: Dawid, Stone & Zidek [9] , Fraser [15] .
Discussion
(i) Scalar case. In §1.3 we began with the simple scalar case, feeling that clarity should be present at that transparent level if sensible inference was to be available more generally. We then found at point (ii) that there were no Bayes-frequency contradictions in the location model case so long as continuity was respected and the Bayes s-value was obtained from the prior expressing the location property. At point (v) we then saw in the non-location case that the p-value retains its interpretation as the statistical position of the data and has full validity, but the Bayes requires a prior fully determined by the form of the model and also data dependent. For the scalar model case this is a radical limitation on the Bayes procedure; in other words inverting the distribution function as pivot works immediately for the frequency approach whereas inverting the likelihood using the conditional probability lemma requires a prior to represent the location property, at least locally. In the scalar model context this represents a full vindication of Fisher [11] , subject to the Neyman [26] restriction that probabilities be attached only to the inverses of pivot sets.
(ii) Vector case. Most models however involve more than just a scalar parameter. So what about the frequency-Bayes disconnect away from the very simple scalar case? The Bayes method arose from an unusual original example, where the parameter was ostensibly generated randomly by a physical process, a separate performance of the original process being studied. Thus a real frequency-based prior was introduced arbitrarily and became the progenitor for the present Bayes procedure. In due course a prior then became a means for exploring, for inserting feelings, or for technical reasons to achieve analysis when direct methods seemed unavailable. But do we have to make up a prior to avoid admitting that direct methods of analysis are not in obvious abundance?
(iii) Distributions for parameters? Fisher presented the fiducial distribution in 1930 and 1935, [11] and [12] , and in various subsequent papers. He was criticized from the frequency viewpoint because his proposal left certain things arbitrary and thus not in a fully developed form as expected by the mathematics community at that time: welcome to statistics as a developing discipline! And he was criticized sharply from the Bayes side by Lindley [24] because Fisher proposed distributions for a parameter and such were firmly viewed as Bayes territoire. We now have substantial grounds that the exact route to a distribution for a parameter is the Fisher route, and that Bayes is an approximation to Fisher confidence and can attain second order validity [15] but just for linear parameters.
But the root problem is that a distribution for a vector parameter is inherently invalid beyond first order [15] : indeed in some generality for a linear parameter the routine frequency and routine Bayes can agree;. But if parameter curvature is allowed then the frequency p-value and the Bayes s-value change in opposite directions: the p-value retains its validity having the Uniform(0,1) property while the Bayes loses this property and associated validity, yet retainss the term probability as used from early on.
The events receiving probabilities are events in the past, and the prior probability input to the conditional probability lemma is there for expediency: the lemma does not create probabilities from no probabilities.
(iv) Conclusions. Most inference contradictions disappear if continuity present in the model is required for the inference calculations. Higher order frequency and bootstrap agree to third order for scalar parameters. Bayes agrees but just for location parameters and then to first order for other parameters; after that, Bayes needs a prior that reflects or approximates a location relationship between variable and parameter.
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